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Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 35, appellant United Park City Mines Company 
("UPCM") petitions this Court for a rehearing of that part of this Court's August 23, 1993 
opinion which affirmed the summary dismissal of UPCM's claims challenging defendants' 
actions in structuring and implementing the 1975 agreements under which UPCM gave up 
its interests in the Park City resort operations, development properties and related water 
rights.1 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court's opinion determined that the UPCM shareholders, as a class, were given 
sufficient information in the proxy statement to put them on notice of further inquiry into 
the fairness of the restructuring agreements and that the statute of limitations began to run 
on October 7, 1975, the date of the special stockholders meeting (Op. 10). In making this 
dispositive conclusion of law, the opinion failed to consider, as required, the facts in the light 
most favorable to UPCM, the non-moving party, and wrongly determined that there were 
no material issues of fact. Rehearing is warranted because the opinion overlooked or 
misapprehended facts which create material fact issues. 
The opinion's conclusions that the proxy statement "stated in detail what UPCM was 
giving and what it was receiving" (Op. 12), and "discloses the very facts out of which UPCM's 
contention of unfairness arises" (Op. 14) overlook and misapprehend the proxy statement's 
misrepresentations and omission of the financial information needed for any fairness 
analysis. The opinion mistakenly accepted the false statement that UPCM did not know the 
1
 A copy of the opinion is included as an Attachment and referenced as (Op. ). 
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current fair market value of the property being purchased by GPCC from UPCM. (Op. 13). 
Contrary to the proxy statement's misrepresentation, defendants did know the current values, 
but intentionally withheld this and other information that would have revealed the unfairness 
of the agreements and that Anaconda and ASARCO and others may have breached their 
fiduciary duties to UPCM. The defendant fiduciaries' wrongful withholding of this critical 
information, their misleading assertions that the 1975 resort agreements would not have a 
"significant effect on the company's assets and business" and their continuing concealment 
and misrepresentation of material facts in response to shareholder inquiries kept UPCM 
shareholders from discovering the breaches of fiduciary duty. 
The opinion erroneously adopted as fact the misrepresentation in the proxy statement 
that the board of directors had concluded the proposed restructuring v/as in UPCM's best 
interests because if UPCM exercised its rights to take back the ski resort and unconveyed 
development property protracted litigation may result. (Op. 12). The facts showed the real 
reason UPCM did not exercise its rights to take back its valuable resort properties and water 
interests, made no effort to obtain a restructuring of GPCC fairer to UPCM and gave up 
even more surface interests was because Anaconda and ASARCO had decided to get UPCM 
out of the resort and land development business and concentrate on mining. The failure to 
disclose this decision to the UPCM shareholders was an intentional concealment of material 
facts by UPCM's controlling stockholders to accomplish their own distinct corporate 
objectives. 
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The opinion erroneously concluded as a matter of law that the shareholders as a class 
were given sufficient information in the proxy statement to put them on notice of further 
inquiry into the fairness of the restructuring agreements. (Op. 10). This conclusion 
overlooks evidence that the UPCM shareholders could not have discovered UPCM's 
fiduciary duty claims before independent management assumed control in 1985. In fact, this 
overlooked evidence shows that it was not until UPCM conducted extensive discovery on its 
initial complaint that it was able to discover that its former controlling shareholders had 
breached their fiduciary duties by causing UPCM to enter into unconscionable agreements 
to protect their own undisclosed and conflicting mining objectives. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OPINION MISAPPREHENDS THE PROXY STATEMENT WHICH ONLY 
SPECIFIED VALUES ON WHAT PARTIES WERE GIVING UP AND 
CONCEALED VALUES OF WHAT THEY WERE GETTING SO NO FAIRNESS 
COMPARISON WAS POSSIBLE 
Summary judgment is a preemptory remedy that is appropriate only when a review 
of all the facts and their inferences in the light most favorable to the party moved against 
reveals that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Min. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1304,1307-08 
(Utah 1987); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H Ins. Co.. 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986). Where 
"there is a fiduciary relationship, such as between corporate officers and a stockholder, the 
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the stockholder discovers, or in the exercise 
of reasonable care should discover, that there is a wrong to be complained of." Stewart v. 
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K&S Co., Inc.. 591 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979) (footnote omitted). The opinion ignored 
these principles. 
UPCM's controlling shareholders, Anaconda and ASARCO, and the other defendants 
knew the current values of the properties that UPCM was giving up and that the 1975 
agreements were unfair to UPCM's outside shareholders. Under the 1975 agreements, 
UPCM gave away its major equity interest in GPCC for $2,000 and extended the ski leases 
on its land for another 40 years for no significant change in the nominal rental. UPCM also 
agreed to continue to sell its unconveyed properties and water rights for the discounted 1971 
price of $4 million but with further extended payments even though in 1975 the development 
properties alone were valued at nearly $40 million, the skiing operations were worth more 
than $15 million and the water rights over $2 million. UPCM Br. at 35-36. 
The Park City land development and resort expansion, along with the growing success 
of the skiing operations, had greatly enhanced the value of the real property, both developed 
and undeveloped which UPCM had contributed to GPCC in 1971. During the 1973-74 and 
1974-75 ski seasons, the resort earned profits of more than $1 million each year and 
accounted for one-third of Utah's ski market. In the spring of 1975 Royal Street prepared 
prospectuses for GPCC stating the residual values of the UPCM properties at $37.8 million 
excluding the Park City resort base facilities, golf course and water rights. The prospectuses 
valued the Deer Valley properties alone at more than $15 million. UPCM Br. at 13, 14 & 
18. 
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The UPCM proxy statement did not reveal the increasing profitability of the ski 
resort operations, nor did it disclose the values of the other properties and their recipients. 
Without this comparative financial information, shareholders could not evaluate the fairness 
of the 1975 agreements. The essential facts necessary for this fairness evaluation which were 
omitted from the proxy statement and concealed from UPCM's shareholders are the 
following: 
(1) UPCM gave away its major equity interest in GPCC, extended the three 
ski leases from the year 2011 to the year 2051 for nothing and sold its property and 
water rights valued by defendants at nearly $40 million for $4 million; 
(2) Royal Street cancelled debts, some questionable, of no more than $2 
million, assumed a $1.5 million loan that it had guaranteed and purchased for $1.9 
million Deer Valley and Park City properties and water rights that it valued at more 
than $18 million; 
(3) Morgan-Fidelity cancelled unsecured debts of $6.8 million for the 
valuable Park City resort facilities and a large percentage of GPCC ski lift revenues, 
many times more than UPCM's nominal percentage; 
(4) Unionamerica cancelled debts of $9.6 million in return for property 
worth nearly $16 million; and 
(5) AMOT purchased GPCC, the golf course and certain water rights 
worth more than $20 million in 1975 for less than $2 million. UPCM Br. 19-23. 
5 
These comparative benefits critical for any fairness determination were not disclosed in any 
way. The opinion's conclusion that the "fairness of the proposal to UPCM was clearly raised 
as the details of the proxy statement were read and considered" (Op. 14) is simply wrong. 
The opinion refers to the six shareholder letters which responded to the proxy 
statement, and erroneously concludes that they "demonstrate that these six shareholders had 
no difficulty in discerning from the proxy statement that UPCM was not receiving adequate 
consideration." (Op. 14). The content of these few letters only demonstrates that the proxy 
statement was inadequate and further information required. Royal Street Br. Add. 4-9. 
That six letters questioning the adequacy of the information in the proxy statement were 
received from over 5,000 shareholders does not mean that the shareholders had knowledge 
of breach of fiduciary duty claims sufficient to put them on inquiry nor does it indicate that 
all other shareholders were "similarly alerted to the questionableness of the proposal." (Op. 
14). 
The one thing that the six letters established was that when any shareholder requested 
more information, defendants responded by continuing to misrepresent and conceal material 
facts about the fairness of the agreements. They did not, as their fiduciary duties required, 
respond by disclosing the values of the property interests UPCM was giving up and others 
were obtaining or by providing any comparative information on which a fairness analysis 
could be made. They merely reassured the shareholders that, while the agreements were 
difficult to understand, they were in their best interests. 
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Contrary to the Court's opinion, the 18 shareholders in attendance at the special 
stockholders meeting did not have "actual notice of the six letters protesting or questioning 
the proposed restructuring that were sent to the Board." (Op. 14). They were only told 
about one letter that had been received requesting adjournment of the meeting until further 
details could be presented. Defendants then disparaged that letter as a "crank letter," "a 
diatribe of misfacts" and one which "made a great many statements which are not accurate 
in all details." In any event, "knowledge of a single stockholder" is not imputed to the 
corporation and the right of a single stockholder to seek a remedy would not of itself set the 
statute of limitations running. See White v. FDIC 122 F.2d 770, 775 (4th Cir. 1941), cert. 
denied, 316 U.S. 672 (1942). 
The defendants' response to attorney Gartner's letter, which requested adjournment 
until a revised proxy statement set forth the fairness of the consideration to be received by 
the UPCM stockholders, presents strong evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Representatives of Anaconda and ASARCO and the other defendants met at UPCM's 
lawyers' offices and discussed how to handle the letter at the special stockholders meeting. 
Nick Badami, president of AMOT, was coached in how to persuade the shareholders that 
the agreements were in UPCM's best interests. Clark Wilson and S. M. Cornwall contacted 
Gartner by telephone to dissuade him from any opposition. UPCM officers sent letters to 
Gartner and the five shareholders who had responded to the proxy statement assuring them 
that the resort agreements, while "very complex and difficult to understand," were in UPCM's 
best interests and that "the proposed arrangement was arrived at after careful consideration 
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of other alternatives and after exhaustive study." These reassuring statements were 
demonstrably false because the UPCM board had not carefully considered alternatives or 
made any exhaustive studies and UPCM's position had been dictated by the policy of 
Anaconda and ASARCO to get UPCM out of the resort and land development business. 
UPCM Br. at 39-41. 
The facts here are similar to those in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 
(10th Cir. 1970), where shareholders' consent to a merger was obtained through misleading 
proxy solicitations and subsequent encouraging letters from management. The deHaas court 
concluded that stockholder reliance on corporate fiduciaries is to be expected and where 
questions or doubts arise concerning corporate actions, it is reasonable for a stockholder to 
rely on the knowledge and integrity of corporate managers. Id- at 1227. The opinion 
distinguished deHaas because "[n]o suggestion of fraud or secret profiting by the board, 
Anaconda or ASARCO is alleged in the present case." (Op. 15) This is error resulting from 
the Court's overlooking allegations and evidence of misrepresentations and concealment by 
these fiduciaries and the secret benefitting, if not profiting, by Anaconda and ASARCO in 
implementing their undisclosed objective to concentrate on mining and have UPCM shed 
its interests in Park City surface operations and activities. 
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II. THE OPINION OVERLOOKS THE CONCEALMENT OF THE MATERIAL 
FACT THAT UPCM DID NOT TAKE BACK ITS VALUABLE PROPERTIES 
OR OBTAIN A RESTRUCTURING OF GPCC FAIRER TO UPCM BECAUSE 
ITS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS WANTED UPCM OUT OF THE 
RESORT AND LAND DEVELOPMENT BUSINESS 
The facts show that Anaconda and ASARCO breached their fiduciary duties of 
loyalty, fairness and care as controlling shareholders by causing UPCM to give away its 
major equity interest in GPCC and other valuable land and water rights so they could 
concentrate on mining and protect their discrete interests in UPCM's underground mining 
properties. The facts also show that Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity, GPCC and AMOT, 
knowing Anaconda and ASARCO's mining policy, induced or aided and abetted these 
breaches or breached their own fiduciary duties to UPCM by overreaching and taking unfair 
advantage of UPCM. 
In 1974 Salomon Brothers studied GPCCs financial condition and proposed a 
number of alternative solutions to preserve GPCC and all of its shareholders' interests, 
including UPCM's major interest. UPCM Br. at 18. However, Anaconda and ASARCO 
were not interested in preserving UPCM's interests and were willing to give up these 
valuable surface interests in the resort, development properties and water rights on any 
terms that the other parties desired provided that they protected their underground mining 
rights and UPCM received the consideration provided in the 1971 agreements. 
Clark Wilson, one of Anaconda's employees on the UPCM and GPCC boards, 
admitted that it was Anaconda and ASARCO's "policy" to "get out of the resort business 
because their first interest was mining." Wilson conceded that with respect to UPCM's 
surface assets, the interests of Anaconda and ASARCO differed from the interests of 
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UPCM's other shareholders. Gilbert Butler, Morgan-Fidelity's representative in the 
restructuring of GPCC, testified that Anaconda and ASARCO "had zero interest in the 
future of the ski resort, zero" and were "very, very serious about trying to protect their 
mining rights." Mr. Butler stated that the mining companies did not attempt to obtain 
anything more than what they had coming under the old 1971 agreements because "they 
basically wanted to protect their mine and protect their principal." Consequently, "Morgan 
never really had any cause to negotiate very much" with Anaconda and ASARCO. Donald 
Prell, Unionamerica's representative in the GPCC restructuring, testified that UPCM "didn't 
want to wind up getting back" the resort properties because they "had the subsurface, the 
mines that they wanted, obviously, to keep." UPCM Reply Br. at 12-13. 
With UPCM relinquishing its equity in GPCC, UPCM no longer had any reason to 
sell more of its water than GPCC and Royal Street actually needed. UPCM easily could 
have retained the additional water to develop its own properties or to sell to others but 
continued to only reserve water for "mining, milling and related purposes." UPCM also sold 
Deer Valley properties not included in the 1971 land agreement to Royal Street at prices 
below market value and some even below cost. UPCM agreed to extend the three ski leases 
for two 20-year terms and substantially enlarge one of them, receiving essentially nothing in 
return. The refusal of Anaconda, ASARCO and UPCM management to retain the 
additional water for all purposes, increase the minimal ski lease revenues and their willing 
disposal of more Deer Valley property manifests their total disinterest in surface activities 
and their indifference to the interests of UPCM's outside shareholders. UPCM Br. 22-23. 
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III. THE OPINION OVERLOOKS MATERIAL FACTS SHOWING THAT UPCM'S 
SHAREHOLDERS WERE MISLED BY THEIR FIDUCIARIES AND COULD 
NOT HAVE DISCOVERED UPCM'S FIDUCIARY CLAIMS UNTIL 1986 
The opinion ignored compelling evidence that UPCM could not discover or assert its 
fiduciary duty claims before independent management assumed control of UPCM in August 
1985. UPCM presented facts which established that independent management was then 
unable to discover the fiduciary duty claims before UPCM filed its initial complaint in 1986, 
because defendants continued to conceal information and deflect inquiries regarding the 
1975 agreements and because information essential to discovery could not be found in 
UPCM's files. The combination of control by Anaconda and ASARCO, the involvement of 
the UPCM directors in the wrongdoing and the concealment of critical facts made it 
impossible for the fiduciary duty claims to have been discovered or asserted earlier. As long 
as wrongdoers remain in control of a corporation, or conceal their wrongdoing from 
shareholders, the statute of limitations on the corporation's claims against them is tolled. 
See, e.g., Mosesian v. Peat. Marwick. Mitchell & Co.. 727 F.2d 873, 876-79 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied. 469 U.S. 932 (1984); IIT. an Int'l. Inv. Trust v. Cornfield. 619 F.2d 909, 928-32 (2d 
Cir. 1980). 
In August 1985, for the first time in its history, UPCM had a board and management 
independent of Anaconda and ASARCO. David Bernolfo representing the Bambergers, 
UPCM shareholders since 1953, then became president of UPCM. Certain problems with 
GPCCs and Royal Street's performance under the resort agreements led Bernolfo to review 
documents in UPCM's files relating to these problems. This investigation raised questions 
11 
regarding the 1975 agreements, answers to which, including what properties UPCM had 
given away and their values, could not be found in UPCM's records. After reviewing title 
to more than 1500 parcels, management was able finally to determine what properties had 
been transferred to Royal Street, Unionamerica and others and what had been retained by 
GPCC. UPCM tried to assign values to these properties but there were no applicable 
appraisals or other valuation information in the UPCM files. 
Clark Wilson refused to answer any questions and told Bernolfo he would instruct 
the others who were involved not to discuss the 1975 agreements. Bernolfo requested 
information from Nick Badami of GPCC and Edgar Stern of Royal Street, but they would 
provide no information. Bernolfo met with the lawyers who had represented UPCM but 
they refused to discuss the agreements and told him to let the matter rest. They also refused 
to provide UPCM documents in the law firms1 files which UPCM had to eventually obtain 
by subpoena. Bernolfo met with S.M. Cornwall who said that he had been told by GPCC 
officials in 1975 that the UPCM properties had no value and that he not only thought the 
land worthless but also that the ski resort was losing money. He also said that UPCM board 
members were told that if UPCM did not agree to the agreements, GPCC was facing 
bankruptcy. Bernolfo learned from GPCC employees that there were a number of buyers 
interested in GPCCs undeveloped properties, that GPCC would not sell any of them and 
that the employees did not believe the rumors in 1975 of a GPCC bankruptcy because of 
its valuable properties and profitable ski resort. UPCM Br. at 47-49. 
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In May 1986, UPCM, through its law firm Callister Duncan & Nebeker, filed the 
initial complaint alleging that Royal Street and GPCC had defrauded UPCM based on facts 
new management and the law firm had been able to learn without the benefit of formal 
discovery. UPCM and its counsel had concluded from these facts that GPCC and Royal 
Street had concealed vital information from Anaconda and ASARCO, UPCM's board of 
directors and minority shareholders. 
In February 1987, UPCM retained current counsel who inquired about the possibility 
of settlement discussions before embarking on the extensive discovery that would be 
required. Counsel for Royal Street and GPCC responded that the fraud and racketeering 
claims made any negotiations difficult and that they believed those claims unfounded. 
Accordingly, counsel agreed to focus discovery on these claims, particularly whether Royal 
Street or GPCC had misrepresented and concealed GPCC information from UPCM and its 
controlling shareholders, Anaconda and ASARCO. 
Through document production and deposition testimony, UPCM learned crucial 
information that it had been unable to obtain before, particularly the 1975 property values 
and the comparative values received by the parties to the agreements. UPCM also learned 
that Anaconda and ASARCO knew the comparative values but had decided in late 1974 to 
get UPCM out of the resort and land development business and concentrate on mining 
UPCM's mining properties. As a result of the facts learned only through this discovery, 
UPCM filed its amended complaint which asserted breach of fiduciary duty claims instead 
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of the fraud and racketeering claims, and added as defendants Anaconda, ASARCO, AMOT 
and Morgan-Fidelity. 
UPCM's shareholders were entitled to accept the representations of their fiduciaries, 
who had an affirmative duty to speak truthfully and disclose all material information. 
Shareholders can rely on the knowledge and integrity of their fiduciaries, deHaas, 435 F.2d 
at 1227, and are not required "to commence a lawsuit in order to procure court-ordered 
discovery of concealed facts," Baskin v. Hawley. 807 F.2d 1120, 1131 (2d Cir. 1986). 
The "question of when [the alleged wrongdoing] was or should have been discovered 
is a question of fact" which may be decided as a matter of law only when "uncontroverted 
evidence irrefutably demonstrates plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the 
fraudulent conduct." Mosesian, 727 F.2d at 877. "The question of what a reasonably 
prudent investor should have known is particularly suited to a jury determination." Id. at 
879. 
A jury would be fully entitled to conclude that UPCM shareholders did not discover 
and could not have discovered the breaches of fiduciary duty prior to 1986. A jury could 
reasonably find that (1) property values and other known comparative facts necessary for 
an understanding and evaluation of the 1975 agreements were intentionally omitted and 
misrepresented in the proxy statement; (2) if the shareholders had any duty of inquiry, they 
satisfied that duty by writing letters to UPCM's board; (3) in response to those inquiries, 
defendants continued to conceal and misrepresent the terms of the agreements; and (4) 
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UPCM shareholders reasonably relied on the representations of their fiduciaries and could 
not have discovered UPCM's fiduciary duty claims without litigation and formal discovery. 
The evidence is not uncontroverted and does not irrefutably demonstrate, as a matter 
of law, that the UPCM shareholders knew or reasonably should have known of the breaches 
of fiduciary duty in 1975 or even before 1986. The evidence raises material issues of fact 
for a jury and is not appropriate for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
A rehearing is required. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID K. WATKISS 
DAVID B. WATKISS 
CAROLYN COX 
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS 
Broadway Centre, Suite 800 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff United Park City Mines (UPCM), a Delaware 
corporation, appeals from a summary judgment dismissing all of 
its claims against all defendants except Greater Park City 
Company (GPCC). The trial court directed the entry of a final 
judgment as to the dismissed claims, making them appealable under 
rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
THE PARTIES 
UPCM, a public company with more than five thousand 
shareholders, is a successor of several mining companies that 
operated mines in and around Park City, Utah. It has not 
actively mined its properties since 1982 but asserts that it 
could in the future. Defendant The Anaconda Company is a mining 
corporation which merged with Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) 
in 1S77. Defendant ASARCO is also a mining corporation. From 
1953 to 1985, Anaconda and ASARCO were controlling shareholders 
of UPCM, and each elected two directors (usually their employees) 
to the seven-member board of directors.1 GPCC is a corporation 
which has operated the Park City Ski Resort and developed land 
since 1971. From 1971 to 1975, GPCC was a closely held 
corporation owned by UPCM and by defendants Royal Street 
Development Company (RSDC), Morgan Guarantee Trust Co. (Morgan), 
Fidelity Bank of Philadelphia (Fidelity), and Unionamerica. As 
will be later explained, GPCC became a wholly owned subsidiary of 
1
 During part of the early 1980s, the board consisted of six 
members. 
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defendant Alpine Meadows of Tahoe, Inc. (AMOT), in 1975, 
Nicholas Badami is the president of AMOT and became the chairman 
of GPCC The following defendants, collectively referred to as 
Royal Street, are related entities owned or controlled by Edgar 
Stern: Deer Valley Resort Company (Deer Valley) is a limited 
partnership which operates the Deer Valley Ski Resort; Royal 
Street of Utah (RSU), a corporation, is the general partner of 
Deer Valley; Royal Street Land Company (Land) is a corporation 
engaged in the ski resort and land development business which 
owns virtually all of the stock of RSU, has effective control 
over RSU, and through RSU has control over Deer Valley. RSDC is 
a corporation which is the affiliate and alter ego of Deer 
Valley, RSU, and Land. RSDC was a shareholder of GPCC from 1971 
to 1975 and operated GPCC during that period under a management 
agreement. 
Defendants Morgan and Fidelity are corporations engaged 
in banking. Defendants Greater Properties, Inc. (GPI), and Park 
Properties, Inc. (PPI), are corporations wholly owned by Morgan 
and Fidelity on behalf of certain commingled pension trusts of 
which Morgan and Fidelity are trustees. GPI and PPI were 
incorporated by Morgan-Fidelity in 1975 to receive a percentage 
of ski-lease income generated by GPCC at the Park City Ski Resort 
and to own the ski-resort base facility. Intervenor Wells Fargo 
Bank has loaned money to Royal Street, and its loans are secured 
by mortgages on certain real and personal property. 
FACTS 
Over the years, UPCM acquired mining properties with 
vast acreage and water rights in and around Park City, including 
the Deer Valley area. It began developing the surface of the 
land in the early 1960s. Park City Ski Resort, then known as 
Treasure Mountain Resort, opened in late 1963 with base and 
summit facilities, chair lifts, and a gondola. Also, a nine-hole 
golf course was developed adjacent to the base facilities. The 
operations continued to grow each year, but additional 
development was required to establish Park City as a destination 
resort. 
In 1970, Edgar Stern of Royal Street made a proposal to 
Anaconda and ASARCO to expand the development of UPCM's resort 
properties. Stern proposed a partnership in which UPCM would 
contribute the land and water, including its existing Park City 
ski operations and resort properties. Royal Street would manage 
and develop the resort and find a third partner to contribute 
capital. For tax reasons, the parties formed a closely held 
corporation instead of a partnership. Thus, GPCC was formed. 
In 1971, a series of land and water agreements and land 
leases were executed (collectively referred to as the 1971 
agreements). In those agreements, UPCM sold Park City Ski Resort 
to GPCC, along with all of the base facilities and other personal 
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property, 4200 acres of development property, and water rights. 
The selling price was $6,12(5,000 payable over time. UPCM also 
leased nearly 6000 acres for ski runs to GPCC for twenty years 
with a twenty-year extension for a rental based on a percentage 
of ski-lift revenues. In return, UPCM received the right to 
participate in the growth of the ski resort as GPCC,s major 
shareholder and senior creditor. 
Throughout much of 1972, 1973, and 1974, GPCC 
experienced financial problems. UPCM charges that Royal Street 
committed management errors, including overexpansion, negligent 
construction practices, construction cost overruns, and unsound 
debt/equity ratios, which, when combined with rising interest 
rates, generated substantial book losses for GPCC. By the summer 
of 1974, GPCC was highly leveraged and unable to service its 
growing debt, then in excess of 20 million dollars. 
In early 1975, GPCC failed to make substantial payments 
due UPCM under the 1971 agreements. UPCM was entitled under the 
cross-default provisions to terminate all of the agreements and 
take possession of the resort facilities and all other unconveyed 
properties covered by the agreements. Instead, UPCM restructured 
the agreements through a series of amendments entered into in 
1975. UPCM continued to sell its properties and water rights for 
the 1971 prices but with extended payments. UPCM gave up its 
major equity interest in GPCC and extended the ski leases for two 
additional twenty-year terms. At a special stockholders' meeting 
held October 7, 1975, the restructuring was approved. A proxy 
statement explaining the proposal had been mailed to each 
stockholder prior to the meeting. As will be hereafter more 
fully discussed, six stockholders wrote the board expressing 
concern over the adequacy of the information in the proxy 
statement and questioning the fairness of the proposal to UPCM. 
In August 1985, Anaconda and ASARCO sold their stock in 
UPCM. New management took control and one year later instigated 
this lawsuit. In 1988, an amended complaint named Anaconda and 
ASARCO as defendants. UPCM contends that prior to 1985, Anaconda 
and ASARCO controlled the board of directors by electing a 
majority of the board. It asserts that all of the directors were 
their employees, former employees, attorneys, bankers, and other 
persons who, due to contractual and historical relationships with 
Anaconda and ASARCO, did not act independently for the best 
interests of UPCM. UPCM alleges that once new management 
arrived, apparent violations of the 1975 restructured agreements 
by GPCC and Royal Street led to an investigation of the 
circumstances surrounding their making. 
The amended complaint charges that Anaconda and ASARCO, 
as controlling shareholders of UPCM in 1975, breached their 
fiduciary duties to UPCM by causing it to give up, for grossly 
inadequate consideration, its valuable interests in the ski 
operations and development properties to protect and concentrate 
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on their interests in Park City Ventures. The latter was a joint 
venture formed in 1970 by Anaconda and ASARCO to mine UPCM's 
properties. Anaconda and ASARCO caused UPCM to lease to Park 
City Ventures all of its mining property and equipment, with 
Anaconda and ASARCO receiving two-thirds of the net mining 
profits. It is not suggested that either Anaconda or ASARCO 
secretly profited in any way by the 1975 restructuring. 
UPCM further alleges that Royal Street and Morgan-
Fidelity owed fiduciary duties to UPCM as co-shareholders with 
UPCM in GPCC and breached those duties by obtaining unfair 
advantage over UPCM in the 1975 restructuring. Finally, it is 
alleged that GPCC and AMOT, to their financial advantage, aided 
and abetted the fiduciary duty breaches by Anaconda, ASARCO, 
Royal Street, and Morgan-Fidelity. 
The amended complaint contains twelve claims for 
relief. The first and second claims seek damages from Anaconda 
and ASARCO for breaches of their fiduciary duties of loyalty, 
fairness, and care in causing UPCM to enter into the unfair 1975 
agreements. The third claim asserts that GPCC, AMOT, Royal 
Street, and Morgan-Fidelity aided and abetted Anaconda's and 
ASARCO's breaches of duty and seeks damages and equitable 
remedies. The fourth claim asserts that Royal Street and Morgan-
Fidelity breached fiduciary duties they owed UPCM as co-
shareholders in GPCC and that AMOT aided and abetted those 
breaches. The fifth and sixth claims allege contractual and 
lease breaches by GPCC and Royal Street. The seventh claim 
alleges trespass by GPCC on UPCM's land. The eighth and ninth 
claims against GPCC and Royal Street seek to remedy underpayment 
of ski-lift revenues owing to UPCM. The tenth claim alleges that 
GPCC violated its duty of good faith in its contractual relations 
with UPCM. The eleventh claim seeks a declaration of Morgan-
Fidelity's rights under the 1975 agreements. Finally, the 
twelfth claim seeks reformation of the water agreements with GPCC 
and Royal Street to allow UPCM to use its reserved 2850 gallons 
per minute for all purposes rather than just for "mining, 
milling, and related purposes." 
The trial court in granting summary judgment held that 
(1) UPCM's claims challenging the 1975 agreements were barred by 
the three-year statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-27 or the four-year statute of limitations in section 
78-12-25(3) because UPCM knew or should have known of its claims 
in 1975; (2) the claims against Anaconda and ASARCO were also 
barred by the doctrine of Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor 
& Aroostock R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 94 S. Ct. 2578, 41 L. Ed. 2d 418 
(1974) } 2 (T) no genuine issues of fact existed as to UPCM's 
1
 Because we hold that the trial court was correct in 
dismissing those claims based on the applicable statutes of 
(Continued on the next page.) 
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claims against Anaconda and ASARCO; (4) UPCM had failed to state 
claims against GPCC or AMOT for aiding and abetting breaches of 
fiduciary duty; (5) UPCM,s claim for reformation of the 
agreements was time-barred and should be denied because of UPCM's 
acceptance of payments under the agreements or because of 
estoppel; (6) any breach of the water agreement by GPCC had been 
cured by full payment of the purchase price for the water, and 
UPCM's other claims for breach were not breaches or had been 
cured or waived; and (7) GPCC had not committed trespass through 
the construction of a ski-lift tower and maintenance building on 
UPCM property. During the pendency of this appeal, UPCM settled 
with Royal Street and intervenor Wells Fargo, and it dismissed 
all claims against them with prejudice. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a summary judgment, this court recites 
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
There must be no material issue of fact. One of the grounds for 
summary judgment was that relevant statutes of limitations had 
expired, thus barring many of UPCM's claims. This being a 
conclusion of law, we review it for correctness. 
CLAIMS AGAINST ANACONDA AND ASARCO 
The trial court found that the evidence was undisputed 
that (1) in 1975, three independent directors were on the UPCM 
board when the restructuring plans and resort agreements were 
considered and approved, (2) the three independent directors had 
full knowledge concerning the terms of the restructuring and its 
effects upon UPCM and then voted in favor of the restructuring, 
and (3) the independent directors were not implicated in any 
wrongdoing, did not have any conflicts of interest, and were 
fully informed of all material facts involving the restructuring 
plan and the subsequent execution of the 1975 agreements. 
Additionally, the trial court found: 
In 1975, the shareholders of UPCM had 
actual knowledge of the restructuring plan 
and the leases and agreements relating 
thereto, or they were put on notice of facts 
which would lead ci person of ordinary 
prudence to discover the alleged wrong-doing, 
sufficient to commence the running of the 
statute of limitations. 
2
 (Footnote continued.) 
limitation, we have no reason to discuss the Bangor Punta 
doctrine. 
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Based on those findings of fact, the trial court held 
that UPCM's action against Anaconda and ASARCO was barred by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-27, which provides: 
Actions against directors or 
stockholders of a corporation to recover a 
penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to enforce 
a liability created, by law must be brought 
within three years after the discovery, by 
the aggrieved party, of the fact upon which 
the penalty or forfeiture attached, or the 
liability accrued, and in case of actions 
against stockholders of a bank pursuant to 
levy of assessment to collect their statutory 
liability, such actions must be brought 
within three years after the levy of the 
assessment. 
UPCM assails those findings of fact and contends that 
it proffered evidence that none of the members of the board of 
directors were independent of Anaconda and ASARCO until August 
1985, when new management took control, and that the statute of 
limitations did not begin to run until that date. 
A corporation discovers wrongdoing by its officers, 
directors, or controlling shareholders through outside 
shareholders or independent directors. "Discovery" of breach of 
fiduciary duty thus has two components: The shareholders or 
directors must have knowledge of the wrongdoing or facts that put 
them on inquiry and must be sufficiently independent to be able 
to assert a claim on behalf of the corporation. As long as the 
wrongdoers remain in control of the corporation and conceal their 
wrongdoing from shareholders or independent directors, the 
statute of limitations on the corporation's claims against them 
is tolled. See, e.g., Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.. 
727 F.2d 873, 876-79 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 932 
(1984); IIT & Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 928-32 
(2d Cir. 1980). 
Some federal courts have held that in order to toil the 
statute of limitations, a plaintiff must allege and show full, 
complete, and exclusive control of the corporation by the 
wrongdoers so that the possibility that an informed stockholder 
or director could have induced the corporation to sue is negated. 
See, e.g., Mosesian, 727 F.2d at 879; International Rys. of Cent. 
Am. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 414 (2d Cir. 1967). 
In United Fruit, the plaintiff corporation brought an 
antitrust and breach of contract action against the defendant, 
which controlled the election of the corporations nine 
directors. The defendant moved for summary judgment based partly 
on the statute of limitations. The corporation contended that 
the statute was tolled until the defendant relinquished its 
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control of the corporation. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined that the statute was not tolled, the action was 
barred, and summary judgment was properly granted. The court 
held that the corporation had failed to carry its burden of 
negating the possibility of suit against the corporation while 
the defendant was in control because three independent directors 
were on the board: 
One principle emerging with some clarity 
is that a plaintiff who seeks to toll the 
statute on the basis of domination of a 
corporation has the burden of showing "a 
full, complete and exclusive control in the 
directors or officers charged." Such control 
was found for example in Adams v. Clarke, 22 
F.2d 957 (9 Cir. 1927), where all the 
directors were accused of wrongdoing and held 
a majority of the capital stock . . . . This 
principle must mectn at least that once the 
facts giving rise to possible liability are 
known, the plaintiff must effectively negate 
the possibility that an informed stockholder 
or director could have induced the 
corporation to sue. And here we think 
[plaintiff] fails. 
Since [plaintiff] has not met its burden 
of demonstrating that, after the election of 
the three independent directors in 1959, 
[defendant] had such "full, complete and 
exclusive control" as to rule out the 
possibility of a corporate suit against it, 
on the demand of a stockholder or director, 
for antitrust violations the facts giving 
rise to which had become well-known, any 
tolling of the statute ended at least by that 
time. 
373 F.2d at 414-16 (citation omitted). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an 
action is time-barred if the plaintiff discovered or should have 
discovered the alleged wrongdoing within the limitcition period 
and that the question of when it was or should have been 
discovered is a question of fact. Mosesian, 727 F«.2d at 877. 
The Mosesian court further added that the question may be decided 
as a matter of law only when " incontroverted evidcmce 
irrefutably demonstrates plaintiff discovered or should have 
discovered the fraudulent conduct.7" Id. (quoting Kramas v. 
Security Gas & Oil Inc., 672 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 459 U.S. 1035, 103 S. Ct. 444, 74 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1982)). 
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In Kramas, the plaintiff actually knew of the alleged fraud. He 
consulted with the Securities and Exchange Commission and even 
suggested to other investors the possibility of an action for 
fraud. 
The Washington Court of Appeals decided a case in which 
a minority stockholder brought a derivative action on behalf of a 
corporate automobile dealership, seeking the profit from the 
majority stockholder, who bought a company-owned car for $6500 
and later sold it for $40,000. The court held that the action 
was barred by the statute of limitations because one officer and 
director of the corporation had knowledge of facts sufficient to 
put one on inquiry, which could have led to the-xliscovery of the 
alleged fraud. Interlake Porsche & Audi, Inc. v. Bucholz, 45 
Wash. App. 502, 728 P.2d 597 (1986). 
The Washington court further held that if one director 
knew facts which by the exercise of due diligence could have led 
to the discovery of the alleged wrongdoing, that director's 
knowledge "is imputed to the corporation." Id. at 607. Finally, 
the court concluded that "even in an action for fraud where a 
fiduciary relation exists, the burden is upon the plaintiff to 
show that the facts constituting the fraud were not discovered 
until within 3 years prior to the commencement of the action." 
Id. at 608. 
Anaconda and ASARCO assert that during the entire 
relevant period of time, including 1974 and 1975, when the 
alleged wrongdoing occurred, there were always three independent 
directors on UPCM/s board who could have instituted legal action 
on behalf of the corporation: 
Sid Cornwall April 1969 to 
Retired partner, December 1980 
VanCott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy 
Miles P. Romney July 1970 to 
Former president, Utah December 1980 
Mining Association (deceased) 
Harold J. Steele April 1969 
President, First to June 1978 
Security Bank 
Wheeler M. Sears January 1981 
President, Cimarron to August 1985 
Corporation 
Hugh J. Leach December 1981 
Vice president, to present 
Western Operations of 
Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co. 
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UPCM counters that these directors may have been 
technically independent in the sense that they were not employed 
by Anaconda or ASARCO but charges that they had close business 
ties with them and thait they therefore could not and did not act 
independently of them. UPCM relies upon Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp. v. Howse, 736 F. Supp. 1437, 1442 (S.D. Tex. 
1990), for the proposition that the statute of limitations is 
tolled as long as controlling shareholders or directors adversely 
dominate a majority of the board, whether or not a minority of 
the board is independent. Farmers & Merchants National Bank v. 
Brvan, 902 F.2d 1520 (10th Cir. 1990), is cited by UPCM as an 
example of where a court found a question of fact to exist as to 
the ability and willingness of the outside directors because of 
their domination to bring suit on behalf of the corporation. 
UPCM points out that Cornwall had for many years been a partner 
in a law firm which represented both Anaconda and UPCM, that 
Romney was a mining consultant who served as president of UPCM 
when the restructuring was approved, and that Steele was 
president of a bank which had long-standing relationships with 
Anaconda and ASARCO. 
We need not and do not decide whether UPCM raised a 
question of material fact as to the domination of these directors 
and their ability and willingness to bring suit on behalf of the 
corporation so as to preclude summary judgment. That is 
unnecessary because we conclude that as a matter of law (1) the 
shareholders, as a class, were given sufficient information in 
the proxy statement that was mailed to them to put them on notice 
of further inquiry into the fairness of the restructuring 
agreements and (2) the statute of limitations began to run on the 
date of the special stockholders' meeting on October 7, 1975. 
In White v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 122 F.2d 
770 (4th Cir. 1941), cert, denied. 316 U.S. 672, 62 S. Ct. 1043, 
86 L. Ed. 1747 (1942), the FDIC brought suit against certain bank 
directors to recover bank assets transferred to them and to 
recover a judgment for bank monies alleged to have been received 
by them, in large part, as collections made on the transferred 
asset. The issue arose as to whether the defendants were 
entitled to the benefit of a statute of limitations* with respect 
to the assets transferred to them and the collections made 
thereon. In holding that the defense was available to the 
defendants, the court stated: 
It is argued that the statute did not 
run in favor of the directors because, it is 
said, they control the corporation through a 
majority of stock ownership and control of 
the directorate and there was consequently no 
one to sue them. It is clear, however, that 
suit in behalf of the corporation could have 
been brought by any of the independent 
stockholders. 
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We do not hold that knowledge of a 
single stockholder or of a bank examiner 
would be imputed to the bank, nor that the 
right of such stockholder or the banking 
authorities to seek a remedy would, of 
itself, set the statute of limitations 
running• What we do hold is that knowledge 
of all the stockholders is knowledge of the 
bank and that where these and the banking 
authorities have such knowledge and have 
power under the law to institute suit and 
take other action to remedy the situation, 
the statute of limitations is set in motion. 
In other words, there is no reason why the 
running of the statute with respect to a 
diversion of assets should be suspended when 
all parties affected thereby have knowledge 
thereof and full power under the law to 
pursue a remedy. 
Id. at 775-76 (citations omitted). 
In Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1983), a 
derivative action was brought by a receiver and a shareholder on 
behalf of a mutual fund, alleging securities fraud. The statute 
of limitations was interposed as a defense which was upheld by 
the trial court on the ground that the shareholders could have 
discovered the alleged fraudulent conduct before the statute of 
limitations ran. This ruling was upheld on appeal where it was 
stated: 
Assuming for the argument only that 
appellants' complaint adequately alleges 
exclusive domination and control [of the 
board of directors], the district court 
nonetheless did not err in holding that 
shareholders as a class should have known the 
skulduggery was taking place . . . . 
. . . "[W]here the circumstances are 
such as to suggest to a person of ordinary 
intelligence the probability that he has been 
defrauded, the duty of inquiry arises, and if 
he omits that inquiry when it would have 
developed the truth, and shuts his eyes to 
the facts which call for investigation, 
knowledge of the fraud will be imputed to 
him." Hicfgins v. Crouse, 147 N.Y. 411, 416, 
42 N.E. 6 (1895). 
11 No. 900306 
Armstrong, 699 F.2d at 88 (citations omitted except White, 122 
F.2d at 775-76). 
Turning to the instant case, the trial court found that 
the six-page proxy statement mailed to the stockholders prior to 
the special meeting held October 7, 1975, "stated in detail what 
UPCM was giving and what it was receiving," We agree. The 
salient points of the proxy statement are summarized in the 
following three paragraphs. 
As the result of GPCC's failure to meet its existing 
contractual obligations, the principal creditors and stockholders 
of GPCC entered into a tentative agreement to adjust the assets 
and liabilities of GPCC. UPCM agreed to the restructuring 
subject to approval by a majority of its stockholders. Anaconda 
and ASARCO approved of the restructuring. The ultimate purposes 
of the intended transaction were to relieve GPCC of real estate 
inventory, real estates held for development, and essentially all 
of its real estate moirtgage debt and to infuse into GPCC adequate 
equity capital to place it on a solid financial footing whereby 
its operations would become successfully and profitably 
conducted. The opinion of management was that if GPCC was not 
restructured, it would not be able to meet its obligations to 
UPCM or its other creditors and would cease to operate. 
One of UPCM's remedies for GPCC's default was to take 
back all of the property sold to GPCC that had not yet been 
conveyed (2014 acres) , to retain all payments which GPCC had 
made, and then to take whatever action was appropriate for the 
operation of the ski properties and development and sale of real 
property. Another option weis to treat the purchase agreement as 
a mortgage and proceed to foreclose it. However, management 
believed that such actions might result in protracted and complex 
legal proceedings and would be detrimental to UPCM's interests. 
Therefore, the board of directors concluded that the proposed 
restructuring would be in UPCM's best interests. 
UPCM owned 63.2 peorcent of the preferred stock and 39.4 
percent of the common stock of GPCC, which it had acquired for 
$972,000. UPCM would sell the preferred stock to GPCC for $1000 
and the common stock to AMOT for $1000. Accrued interest due and 
owing from GPCC to UPCM in the amount of $248,6523 would be 
cancelled. No payment of principal owing on the contract for the 
purchase of land would be required until 1978. The ski leases 
would be amended to provide for two additional extensions of 
6
 Including accrued and unpaid interest under the purchase 
agreement in the amount of $169,030; accrued and unpaid interest 
under the water rights agreement in the amount of $17,500; and 
accrued and unpaid interest on a stockholders loan (all 
stockholders of GPCC infused capital in the amount of $2,000,000, 
UPCM's share of which was $7 87,040) in the amount of $62,122. 
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twenty years each with a small percentage increase in the ski-
lift revenue. The current fair market value of the property 
being purchased by GPCC under the 1971 agreements was not known 
by UPCM. The principal assets in which the other parties were 
involved in the restructuring were discussed. 
At the special stockholders' meeting held on October 7, 
1975, a letter the board received from Jerome Gartner, a New York 
City attorney, was discussed. Gartner wrote the letter on behalf 
of Timothy Donath, a long-time UPCM shareholder. He demanded 
that the scheduled stockholders' meeting be adjourned 
until you issue a revised proxy statement 
setting forth the fairness of the 
consideration to be received by the [UPCM] 
stockholders; and consider, review and modify 
your proposed final sale of the valuable ski 
resort . . . . And further, that you take 
immediate steps to withdraw your signature 
and approval from the proposed reorganization 
of GPCC (Greater Park City Corporation, which 
presently controls the ski area) and related 
corporations, until careful review of the 
proposed abandonment of the invaluable rights 
of the ski area now possessed by [UPCM]. 
At the stockholders' meeting, the directors discounted the claims 
made by Gartner, and Miles P. Romney (then president of UPCM) 
responded by telegram to Gartner that the directors had 
considered his objections and concluded that it was in the best 
interests of UPCM to agree to the proposed restructuring. 
Five other stockholders also wrote the board, 
questioning the adequacy of the consideration that UPCM would 
receive in the restructured agreements. For example, one 
stockholder called the proposal a "boondoggle" and said that it 
was 
interesting to note that an asset with 
sufficient book value to act as a tax 
deduction, now has absolutely no value 
. . . . Two new corporations born on the 
assets of a bankrupt. The ramifications are 
so deep, so insidious and unbelievable that, 
it could constitute a text for uncontrolled 
corporate maneuver. 
Another stockholder felt so ignorant of the "terms, legal 
claptrap arguments, evasions, and loopholes involved in the proxy 
statement" that he signed under protest to preserve his rights to 
seek legal redress against UPCM if there "is any larceny, legal 
or illegal rascality or subterfuge involved." 
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It is true, as argued by UPCM, that more information 
could have been included in the proxy statement which would have 
further illuminated any unfctirness in the proposal. However, 
disclosure of every dsrtail is not required. All that is required 
is that the proxy statement contain sufficient information to 
apprise the stockholders of the corporation's action so as to put 
them on notice to make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or 
questions about the proposal- White, 122 F.2d at 774-75; 
Armstrongy 699 F.2d at 88-89* The statement here discloses the 
very facts out of which UPCM's contention of unfairness arises. 
It details that GPCC was in default and that UPCM could terminate 
the contracts to sell GPCC land and water and cancel the ski 
leases. A quarter of a million dollars of interest was being 
forgiven. For two thousand dollars, UPCM was giving up its 
preferred and common stock in GPCC for which it had paid nearly a 
million dollars. The ski lGtases were being extended for only a 
slight increase in the ski-rental revenue. Generous concessions 
on the part of UPCM were evident throughout the proxy statement. 
The fact that the board did not know the current value of the 
properties involved in the agreement raised a question as to the 
wisdom of the restructuring as opposed to repossessing the 
properties. We acknowledge that only the eighteen shareholders 
who personally attended the stockholders' meeting had actual 
notice of the six letters protesting or questioning the proposed 
restructuring that were sent to the board. We mention the 
letters only to demonstrate that these six shareholders had no 
difficulty in discerning from the proxy statement that UPCM was 
not receiving adequate consideration. There is no reason to 
suspect that other shareholders who studied the proxy statement 
could not have been similarly alerted to the questionableness of 
the proposal. The fairness of the proposal to UPCM was clearly 
raised as the details of the proxy statement were read and 
considered. 
UPCM relies upon deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. 
Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970), 
as controlling. In deHaas, shareholders brought a derivative 
suit in connection with a merger of a parent and its subsidiary 
corporation. The defendants argued that the statute of 
limitations had expired because the named plaintiffs had "doubts 
about the advisability of the merger, . . . were acquainted with 
key officers of [the parent corporation], and yet failed to make 
inquiries or protests against the action." Id. at 813. The 
plaintiffs, however, argued that their consent was obtained 
through misleading proxy solicitations and subsequent encouraging 
letters from management. Id. at 812. They also argued that 
"while they doubted that the merger was good business practice, 
they relied upon [the controlling shareholders'] integrity and 
the information provided them by management" and that they had no 
reason to suspect fraud until much later. Id. at 813. The 
deHaas court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, 
finding that there was a fact question as to the amount of 
knowledge available to the plaintiffs and the reasonableness of 
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their conduct. Id. We do not question the rationale of deHaas; 
however, it is not controlling here. No suggestion of fraud or 
secret profiting by the board, Anaconda, or ASARCO is alleged in 
the present case. Moreover, the proxy statement in the instant 
case was, as has been pointed out, sufficient to raise questions 
of fairness of the proposal presented, whereas in deHaas the 
court found that the proxy material was "clearly inadequate to 
have aroused a reasonable suspicion." deHaas, 435 F.2d at 1226; 
see Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp., 866 F.2d 1480, 1491 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (statute tolled where there was fraudulent 
concealment). 
Therefore, we hold that the statute of- limitations 
began to run on October 7, 1975, barring UPCM's claims against 
Anaconda and ASARCO long before this action was filed. 
CLAIMS AGAINST AMOT AND MORGAN-FIDELITY 
UPCM alleged that AMOT and Morgan-Fidelity (and GPI and 
PPI) induced, aided, and abetted Anaconda and ASARCO in breaching 
their fiduciary duty. UPCM further alleged that Morgan-Fidelity 
breached fiduciary duties they owed to UPCM as co-venturers, de 
facto partners, and co-shareholders in GPCC. It sought 
refonaation of certain provisions of the 1975 agreements which it 
considered unconscionable. The trial court dismissed the claims 
for aiding and abetting and for breach of duty because they were 
barred by the four-year statute of limitations for actions not 
otherwise provided for by law, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3). As 
a general rule, the statute begins to run upon the happening of 
the last event necessary to complete the cause of action. Becton 
Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). All 
acts by AMOT and Morgan-Fidelity which are complained of occurred 
no later than the date of UPCM shareholders' meeting, October 7, 
1975, and we have held that UPCM's shareholders indisputably had 
sufficient knowledge to put them on inquiry. We therefore affirm 
the dismissal of those claims against AMOT and Morgan-Fidelity. 
We also affirm the dismissal of the claim for reformation of the 
1975 agreements because it is barred by section 78-12-23(2), 
requiring actions based on a written contract to be brought 
within six years. Cf. Reese Howell Co. v. Brownf 48 Utah 142, 
158 P. 684 (1916); Weight v. Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 147 P. 899 
(1915). 
CLAIMS AGAINST GPCC 
UPCM sought reformation of the 1975 agreements as 
against GPCC to remedy their unconscionable unfairness resulting 
from GPCC's breaches of fiduciary duty to UPCM and aiding and 
abetting Anaconda and ASARCO in their breaches. In particular, 
the two additional twenty-year extensions of the ski leases were 
assailed as unfair. UPCM also sought to reform the 1971 water 
agreement to permit it to use its reservation of 2850 gallons per 
minute of group II water for any and all purposes rather than 
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only for "mining, milling and related purposes11 as the agreement 
provides. UPCM argues that these provisions were unconscionable 
when the contracts were made in 1971 and in 1975 and that their 
unconscionability has been €>xacerbated by subsequent events. 
Therefore, it is clear that the applicable six-year statute of 
limitations on actions on written contracts began to run no later 
than 1975 and had long expired before this action was filed in 
1986. 
UPCM further alleged that GPCC breached the 1971 water 
agreement by filing with th€i Utah state engineer a bad-faith 
protest against UPCM's application to the engineer for an 
extension of time to resume the use of certain of its water 
rights. In the water agreement, UPCM reserved 2850 gallons 
flowing from eleven of its mining claims. It is now not using 
any water from five of the claims but asserts that it may use 
that water in the future if it resumes mining operations. 
Paragraph 14 of the water acjreement prohibits GPCC from taking 
any action without UPCM's approval "which may impair water 
rights." The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
GPCC on this issue on the ground that after the commencement of 
this action, GPCC made the final payment of the purchase price 
for the water, rendering moot any cause of action UPCM might have 
had for breach of contract. This was error. Clearly, the 
obligation imposed on GPCC by paragraph 14 survives payment of 
the purchase price. That paragraph imposes a continuing duty on 
GPCC to protect the water right, the use of which under the 
agreement is shared by both UPCM and GPCC. Because of this 
shared use, the agreement requires cooperation and the exercise 
of good faith between the users to use the water beneficially to 
protect the water right from being lost due to forfeiture for 
nonuse. 
UPCM has also alleged that the water agreement has been 
breached by the failure of GPCC to pay the cost of treating the 
water coming from the Ontario No. 2 drain tunnel. While the 
facts in the record regarding this matter are sketchy, it appears 
that the water is polluted as it emerges from the drain tunnel 
and that since 1982, UPCM has treated the water at an annual cost 
of approximately $350,000. UPCM contends that this cost should 
have been borne by GPCC under paragraph 5 of the water agreement, 
which requires GPCC to pay the cost of treatment "as necessary 
for the purposes of GPCC." The trial court granted GPCC summary 
judgment on this cause of action on the ground that GPCC/s final 
payment of the purchase price rendered moot any cause of action. 
This was error. Since the water agreement contemplates and 
provides for joint use of the water, final payment of the 
purchase price does not affect the continuing nature of the 
obligation imposed in paragraph 5. Factual questions remain as 
to how much, if any, of the water GPCC uses and is thereby liable 
for treating. We also find unavailing the trial court's 
reasoning that UPCM had waived or was estopped from asserting 
this cause of action for breach of contract because during the 
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years in question UPCM treated the water at its own cost and, in 
its annual report to its shareholders, reported that GPCC was 
current in its obligations. Waiver requires the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. See Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret 
Fed. Sav. & Loan, P.2d , (Utah 1993) (citing Phoenix 
Inc. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308, 311-12 (1936)). 
Estoppel requires "(1) an admission, statement, or act 
inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by 
the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or 
act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing 
the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, 
statement, or act." Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). Factual-questions remain 
as to whether the elements of waiver can be made out and whether 
the elements of estoppel are present, including whether GPCC 
relied to its detriment on the statements in the annual reports 
and whether it sustained an injury. 
In the final cause of action for breach of contract, 
UPCM alleged that GPCC failed to include in its calculation of 
revenue from the sale of ski-lift tickets (a percentage of which 
revenue UPCM is entitled to) the value of lift tickets GPCC 
traded for goods and services, sold at a discount, or gave away. 
In 1985, UPCM audited the lift-revenue accounting records for the 
first time and discovered this omission. The trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of GPCC on the ground that UPCM had 
waived or was estopped from pursuing any claim for breach of 
contract because UPCM had certified to an escrow agent for the 
parties and reported in its annual report to its shareholders 
that GPCC was current in its payments under the ski leases. Once 
again, summary judgment was improperly granted because the record 
does not reflect undisputed facts which would support the 
invocation of waiver or estoppel. Remand on this issue therefore 
is required for the trial court to further consider this cause of 
action with the other two causes of action for breach of contract 
discussed above. UPCM does not dispute that all of its claims 
for breach of contract would be subject to the six-year statute 
of limitations contained in section 78-12-23(2). 
Finally, UPCM contends that GPCC trespassed by 
constructing a maintenance building and a ski-lift tower (the 
Town Lift) on UPCM property which was not under lease to GPCC. 
The trial court held that these trespass claims failed 
(1) because of UPCM's contractual duties of cooperation with GPCC 
under paragraph 19 of the land purchase agreement, (2) because of 
UPCM's written and verbal consent to GPCC's use of the land in 
question, and (3) because the Town Lift was constructed on 
property subject to the resort-area lease. We shall consider 
each of these grounds. 
Paragraph 19 provides: 
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UPCM will, upon request, grant to [GPCC] such 
easements over its properties as may be 
reasonably necessary for ingress and egress 
to and from any of the Subject Properties, 
provided that the nature and duration of such 
easements shall be subject to the approval of 
[UPCM] and the use thereof shall be subject 
to such reasonable conditions and 
restrictions as [UPCM] shall impose. 
That paragraph deals with the granting of easements for 
ingress and egress and cannot be construed to require UPCM to 
allow a building and a ski-lift tower to be built on nonleased 
property. Doing so would require us to stretch the language far 
beyond any reasonable limits. The alleged trespasses cannot 
therefore be justified under paragraph 19. 
As to UPCM's giving written and verbal consent to the 
location of the maintenance building, the record reflects that an 
issue of fact exists. While GPCC apparently relies on a 
deposition of E. LaMar Osika, former secretary of UPCM, that 
consent was given, UPCM relies on the affidavit of Osika 's son, 
Edwin L. Osika, Jr., presently executive vice president and 
secretary-treasurer, that while the subject was discussed, no 
agreement was reached. There being a dispute in the facts, 
summary judgment cannot rest on the ground of consent. 
The final ground relied upon by the trial court for 
summary judgment was that the Town Lift had been constructed by 
GPCC on land under its lease. UPCM counters that while the site 
of the lift was originally under the lease, UPCM had the right 
under paragraph 14 to sell certain parts of the leased premises 
that GPCC was not using to third parties, provided GPCC was given 
the first right of refusal. Pursuant to this provision, UPCM 
gave one John Sweeney an option to purchase seventy-five acres 
which included the lift site. GPCC declined to exercise its 
first right of refusal. Before the option expired, the parties 
entered into a third amendment to the lease on December 12, 1980, 
which excluded the seventy-five acres from the scope cf the 
lease. Sweeney did not exercise his option, but his failure to 
do so did not bring the property back under the l€*ase. 
In its brief, GPCC asserts that it did not receive any 
consideration for excluding the seventy-five acres from the lease 
in the third amendment. However, the amendment recites that 
"good and valuable consideration" has been given, the "receipt 
and sufficiency whereof are hereby acknowledged." GPCC has not 
in its pleadings sought to be relieved of its agreement under the 
third amendment because of lack of consideration. Consequently, 
that defense is not before us. The summary judgment cannot be 
supported on the ground that the Town Lift site is under the 
lease. The summary judgment on the trespass claims is therefore 
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reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings on 
these claims. 
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 56(f) 
Soon after UPCM amended its complaint, adding 
additional defendants, including Anaconda and ASARCO, a motion 
was made to disqualify UPCM's legal counsel. Discovery was 
stayed pending resolution of that motion, which was eventually 
denied. When the stay was lifted, defendants moved for summary 
judgment. In response, UPCM moved for additional time for 
discovery pursuant to rule 56(f). It argued that it had been 
unable to depose certain key witnesses, many of _:whom were 
employees or former employees of Anaconda and ASARCO, and to 
obtain vital documents held by those two former majority 
stockholders. Further discovery, UPCM asserted, would assist in 
finding whether defendants had breached their fiduciary duty or 
aided or abetted others in doing so, whether UPCM could have 
discovered or asserted its fiduciary duty claims in 1975, and 
whether GPCC breached the 1971 and 1975 agreements. The trial 
court denied UPCM's motion. 
We have held that when a party timely presents an 
affidavit under rule 56(f) stating reasons why it is unable to 
proffer an evidentiary affidavit in opposition to its opponent's 
motion for summary judgment, the trial court's discretion is 
invoked. Unless the court finds the affidavit "*dilatory or 
lacking in merit, the motion should be liberally treated.'11 Cox 
v. Winters. 678 P.2d 311, 312-13 (Utah 1984) (quoting Strand v. 
Associated Students of Univ. of Utah. 561 P.2d 191, 194 (Utah 
1977)) . 
We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of UPCM's 
motion as respects its claims which we have held in this opinion 
are barred by statutes of limitations. Prior to making Anaconda 
and ASARCO defendants, UPCM obtained from them many documents 
pertaining to the 1971 and 1975 agreements. Moreover, as we have 
noted above, the evidence is undisputed that UPCM's shareholders 
either knew or had sufficient knowledge in 1975 to put them on 
further inquiry concerning any breach of duty defendants owed 
UPCM. Further discovery against Anaconda and ASARCO would not 
have altered or diminished that fact. 
However, the motion for additional time for discovery 
with respect to UPCM's breach of contract and trespass claims 
against GPCC stands on a different footing. We have determined 
that summary judgment was improper because there are factual 
issues which must be resolved in an evidentiary hearing. On 
remand, the trial court should liberally grant both parties the 
opportunity for further discovery as may be reasonably necessary 
to assist in the resolution of those claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment appealed from is affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the trial court 
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice" 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Norman H. Jackson, Court of 
Appeals Judge 
Stewart, Justice, having disqualified himself, does not 
participate herein; Jackson, Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
No. 900306 20 
